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In his comprehensive review and assessment of "punitive civil sanctions,"
Professor Kenneth Mann has shown us that the prosecution of white-collar
crime is being transformed.1 The criminal law is now being used not only to
imprison offenders but also to provide the basis for financial remedies, such
as forfeiture, profit-fines, and restitution. Probation is being used to impose
conditions on businessmen and corporations, making it the functional counter-
part of injunctive remedies. And civil damage actions are being brought to
supplement criminal cases-sometimes for treble damages or for punitive
damages. Either the state or the victims of the offenses, alone or in class
actions, may bring these damage actions. There is even talk of allowing private
parties once again to initiate certain kinds of criminal prosecutions, in addition
to or in lieu of the state.
The conduct ordinarily described as white-collar crime 2 is under attack in
all the ways available to the regulatory state-through criminal, civil, and
administrative law. The objective seems to be to achieve the state's regulatory
purpose unimpeded by the "technical" limits imposed by criminal law or
criminal procedure. This results in the erosion of formal distinctions between
"criminal" and "civil" actions. The erosion, by collapsing traditional categories,
has created a serious risk that the central role of criminal law in a system of
sanctions may be compromised or even lost.
In this Comment, I would like to supplement Professor Mann's observations
by describing some of the currents in criminal law, criminology, and public
opinion that have brought us to our present situation.
I
The central concepts of what we now regard as a distinctive body of
criminal law emerged from cases involving crimes of passion, violence, and
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theft. These concepts take as their model the genuinely culpable individual who
"deserves" to be used for the criminal law's purposes-whose condemnation
will assuage retributive impulses, deter potential offenders, reinforce legal
norms, and lead to incarceration of the demonstrably dangerous. Much of
contemporary scholarly writing embraces this model and treats it as fundamen-
tal, as inherent in the very concept of crime. To lack culpability (blameworthi-
ness), it is said, is not to be a criminal at all. The underlying assumptions are
that criminal law is less concerned with social control of deviant behavior than
with defining who should be used in that effort, and that criminal law is a
technique of social control which is to be used sparingly-with a wholesome
regard for its stigmatizing power and the extraordinary pains imposed by
imprisonment.
This attitude underlies the very important United States Supreme Court
opinion, Morissette v. United States.3 In that case, the Court held that mens
rea was required for criminal liability even when the statute creating the crime
does not use any of the talismanic words of mens rea, such as malice, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness. In effect, the Court said that a legislature must
virtually negate the mens rea requirement before it will construe a statute as
having imposed strict liability. The Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute (ALI) has largely adopted this position: if the state wishes to punish
conduct without a showing of some mens rea, it must call the conduct a
violation, not a crime; it may not imprison the offender; and it may impose only
de minimis sanctions.4
Those who embrace the dominant theory have treated as virtually illegiti-
mate the older lines of cases that reflected an entirely different theory-one that
focused more on achieving social control than on assessing personal culpability.
This secondary theory is exemplified in the opinions of English and American
courts dealing with offenses like bigamy and adultery-older versions of what
we now tend to call public welfare offenses.5 Those opinions reflected a
willingness on the part of courts and legislatures to abandon, or at least to limit
sharply, a subjective theory of liability when necessary to achieve important
social objectives. As Holmes pointed out in his famous essay The Criminal
Law,6 from the beginnings of our criminal law, courts have not hesitated to
impose criminal liability on those who are only objectively liable. And that
perspective has endured to the present day. Our Supreme Court has upheld the
imposition of strict liability, or liability for negligence or vicarious liability, for
offenses carrying very heavy prison sentences.7 Those cases, like the earlier
3. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
4. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.04(5), 2.05(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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ones, assume that to achieve social control it may be necessary to abandon the
mens rea requirement or to keep notions of subjective culpability to a minimum.
The two theories of criminal liability--one emphasizing social control and
the other stressing personal culpability-have long been competing for primacy,
most conspicuously in the law of traditional crimes. Doctrines based on objec-
tive theories of liability (like the felony murder rule or vicarious responsibility)
have met fierce criticism.8 For the most part, the advocates of personal culpa-
bility and strict procedures have won the contest. But in doing so, they have
tended to carry their critique beyond the traditional crimes to which it had been
addressed-the crimes of passion and violence and theft. These crimes are
indeed "personal" and are easy targets for a subjective theory. It is less clear
that the subjectivist critique has equal application to the new types of crimes.
These are usually characterized by vague definitions and by the abandonment
or reduction of the mens rea requirement, as legislatures try to respond to the
pressures of the Industrial Revolution and the regulatory state. Nevertheless,
the academic community and the ALI have tended to describe the law on the
books as if it had already accepted the subjective theory of liability across the
board.
This apparent consensus has made legislatures, courts, and prosecutors
reluctant to use criminal law to achieve the kind of social control that is the
raison d'etre of many of the new regulatory crimes. Thus, by narrowing the
boundaries of the area that may or should be reached by criminal law, the
reformers have created strong pressures on the courts either (1) to stretch
criminal law beyond the newly proper ("subjectivist") boundaries, or (2) to
avoid the constraints associated with criminal law and criminal procedure by
abandoning the criminal law as a regulatory tool. The latter course, abandon-
ment, would obviously be easier if civil measures were available that could do
better, and more efficiently, the work of criminal law in the specialized areas
associated with white-collar crime.
II
The increasing prominence of civil sanctions also receives support from
Edwin Sutherland's influential theory of white-collar crime and from the
populist impulses latent in that theory.9 In his studies of high status individuals
who had violated the law, Sutherland counted as crimes events that "were rarely
prosecuted in criminal court: they were violations of administrative rules or
simply contract cases to be processed, if at all, in civil court." 10 In his view,
8. For a summary of the various positions, see MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.06 cmt
at 302 (1985); Id. § 210.2 cMt. at 30 (1980); LAFAVE & SCOrr, supra note 5, at §§ 3.9(d), 7.5.
9. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
10. See Stanton Wheler, White-Collar Crime, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OFCRIME AND JUSTICE 1652, 1653
(Sanford Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing SUTHERLAND, supra note 9).
1992] 1897
The Yale Law Journal
it was overly technical to act as if crimes do not exist because they have not
led to prosecution and conviction. He also believed that the criminal charge was
an especially unreliable guide to the nature and extent of crime because white-
collar offenders were prosecuted less often and punished less severely than
ordinary offenders were.
Sutherland's work on white-collar crime provides a direct link to a regulato-
ry approach that locates criminal law alongside the other methods of controlling
deviant behavior. A corollary of that approach is that policymakers in complex
economic and technological areas must take into account that, for those persons
whose conduct they are trying to reach, the fruits of offending outweigh the
harm of punishment. From this perspective, the difficulty of effectuating public
policy against such offenders makes it necessary to augment the criminal law
with a wider range of sanctions and processes.
The connotation of the term "white-collar crime" has had a powerful effect
on public attitudes and on the content of criminal law and criminal procedure.
The term evokes a highly emotive image of great corporations and those who
run them making all of us their victims-overcharging us for our purchases,
polluting our environment, and making us less safe so that they may make more
money. These are the consummately rational offenders who know what they
are doing to us, who are motivated by greed, and who get away with their
conniving. In dealing with such offenders, the argument continues, the criminal
law is beset with technicalities that sacrifice regulatory objectives on the altar
of a pure doctrine of personal culpability. That doctrine may have a place in
conventional criminal law where a wide array of sociological and psychological
"explanations" for crime exists and where defendants are seen as poor and
untutored, often abused by the police, and needing protection from excessive
interrogation and arbitrary searches. For such defendants, it may seem appropri-
ate to indulge in doctrines favoring innocence. White-collar offenders, on the
other hand, are widely perceived as deserving little or no sympathy because of
their status, wealth, and education.
The spotlight that the social science literature and the popular media have
focused on alleged favoritism for the affluent has contributed to a reduction in
the protections accorded to defendants in cases of white-collar crime. Notions
of personal guilt are readily abandoned as negligence, strict liability, and
vicarious liability are routinely put to use. Concepts like "enterprise" and
"pattern of racketeering activity" are permitted to take their places alongside
"conspiracy" as even looser vehicles for imposing group and vicarious liabili-
ty." The maxim that criminal statutes must be construed strictly is often
replaced with a principle of liberal construction in favor of the government. The
11. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); cf.
Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE LJ. 405, 463 (1959) (characteriz-
ing conspiracy under federal law as "a Kafkaesque crime, unknown and unknowable except in terms of the
facts of each case-and even then, not until the verdict has been handed down").
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law of presumptions is stretched to make up for expected difficulties of proof
in complex cases. And the courts tolerate an extraordinary measure of vague-
ness in defining crime. Reducing these protections has provided an incentive
to "decriminalize" white-collar offenses-by adding more easily applied and
substitutable civil sanctions-not out of sympathy for these offenders but to
be "tougher" on them and to regulate their conduct more effectively.
III
What we now have is a helter-skelter cumulation of processes and sanc-
tions. Civil processes and sanctions have emerged that are often more punitive
than criminal processes but equally stigmatizing. 12 Yet civil sanctions may
bring with them fewer procedural protections than do criminal sanctions: they
may be established by a preponderance of evidence, and need not meet the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard; they may be instituted by private
parties without being screened by a public prosecutor serving as surrogate for
the public interest; and they may be tried by a judge rather than a jury.
Professor Mann has demonstrated that we are at a critical divide. We who
teach and write on criminal law have been so absorbed with traditional crimes
that we have slighted a new field that competes directly with the criminal law
and threatens to supplant it. The challenge now is to separate out the several
strands-to recognize that each civil and criminal remedy is part of a network
of sanctions designed to control deviant behavior, to provide screening mecha-
nisms to determine which sanction should be brought to bear, and by whom,
in order to make law enforcement more effective overall; and to create the
hybrid procedures uniquely appropriate to each of these hybrid processes. If
we do not succeed in meeting this challenge, there is a genuine risk that the
stigma and sanctions associated with "crime" will be imposed, in both civil and
criminal processes, on persons who are not culpable in any widely accepted
sense of that term. If that happens, if offenders who do not match the public
image of criminality are too casually found to be criminal, the "crime" label
will lose its incremental utility, the moral force of the criminal sanction will
be dissipated, and many more people will suffer unjust treatment.
12. For example, civil sanctions include deprivation of a license, barring a person from holding office,
deportation, civil commitment, and forfeiture.
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